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The West’s  increasing  self-absorption verging on the narcissistic-a trend 
that has become all the more pronounced since  the Brexit  referendum and 
the Trump election in 2016–has made many of us ‘over here’ forget that 
there is another very different world ‘out there’ about which most of our 
leaders know very little and think about  even less. yet as our contributors 
here show, in this ‘new’ world, other people in other places  have other, 
rather more important things to worry about than the comings and goings of 
western politicians and pundits–few of whom travel or ever leave their desks, 
and the majority of whom happen to live comfortable, incredibly parochial, 
lives in Washington, Paris, London, and Rome.  It is one of the great virtues 
of this excellent Report that it forces us all to come to terms with a quite 
different part of the world, that stretching from Russia across the whole of 
asia encompassing well over half of the world’s population and a larger and 
larger share of the world’s wealth. Here, new institutions and new deals are 
being struck, new complex alliances being forged  by actors with hardly any 
reference at all to the West. The West may still retain considerable assets. 
But unless it begins to take a lot more notice of decisions being taken by 
‘others’ who do not necessarily share its outlook, it will soon find itself 
becoming increasingly marginal in a world where its once influential voice 
will carry less and less weight. This Report is not only highly informative: 
in its own way it also stands as a warning. 
This LSE IDEaS report is the result of the daring imagination and 
boundless energy of Zachary Paikin, our talented final-year PhD 
student at Kent, and the intellectual and financial backing of the 
GCRF COMPaSS and H2020 UPTaKE projects. The success of this 
workshop also owes a debt of gratitude to the tireless backstage 
work of the LSE IDEaS staff (Emilia Knight and Dora Hegedus 
especially) and the visionary leadership of Professor Michael Cox, 
as well as the enthusiastic commitment of all participants–that 
is, despite the impending festive season, unfinished Christmas 
shopping and piles of marking to deliver. We are grateful to you all!  
   –Professor Elena A. Korosteleva
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FivE YEars aFTEr Maidan:  
Toward a GrEaTEr Eurasia? 
Elena Korosteleva, Zachary Paikin and Stephen Paduano
Earlier this year marked the fifth anniversary of the Maidan Revolution, resulting in the dismemberment of Ukraine. The country’s territorial integrity has yet to be restored following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in support of anti-
government rebels in the Donbas, where a hot war continues to rage.
at a minimum, two processes simultaneously drove the onset of crisis 
in Ukraine. First, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was 
left effectively as a rump state with little to no tradition of independent 
statecraft. The process of both state-building and nation-building that 
followed–on a multi-ethnic borderland no less–has only been partially 
consolidated, leaving the country politically fragile, regionally divided, 
and a public grown tired of promises to do something about corruption.
Second, however, were the broader trends in Russia-West relations. Much 
as the interwar years were conceived of as a ‘twenty years’ crisis’ by E.H. 
Carr, the period from 1989 to 2014 has been called a twenty-five years’ 
crisis by some. Dreams of a ‘common European home’ and a ‘Europe 
whole and free’ were conjured up, but disagreement on the substance 
as well as entrenched political and security structures rendered them 
difficult to realise. The unintended outcome was the launch not of 
unifying, but parallel region-building initiatives–the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) by the European Union (EU), and the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EaEU) by Russia–effectively targeting the same space in-between, 
with Ukraine becoming the tragic epicentre of these initiatives.
With both the EU and the EaEU attempting to woo Ukraine, two seemingly 
incompatible regulatory orders collided, inaugurating a period of outright 
hostility between Russia and the West and bringing the post-Cold War 
era to an end. Gone were the visions of a Greater Europe from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok, eventually replaced by Russia’s calls for a ‘Greater 
Eurasia’–an integrated supercontinent that could bring different regional 
orders together in a cooperative fashion across the entire Eurasian 
space. However, achieving dialogue for cooperation has proven difficult, 
being driven on both sides by differing normative and regulatory 
visions for the integrated space. In particular, the Kremlin’s emphasis 
on ‘polycentrism’ has come up against Brussels’ vision of expanding 
the reach of EU norms and standards.
This report,  
building on a 
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at LSE IDEAS in 
December 2018 
and supported 
by the Horizon 
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although the EaEU now appears to be more focused 
on Central asia and China, aiming to strengthen 
Russia’s position as a bridge between asian and 
European markets, one of its original intentions was 
to provide Ukraine with an alternative to signing an 
association agreement with the EU. This raises 
questions as to whether Russia’s vision of Greater 
Eurasia is more reactive than thought-through. Some 
contend that Moscow and Beijing may have begun to 
construct a shared regional order in Eurasia, rooted 
in common rules of the game such as respect for 
each other’s interests and the avoidance of zero-sum 
dynamics. Others assert that Russia largely remains 
psychologically oriented toward (or at least rooted 
in) the European political-cultural space, and that 
its failure to convince Ukraine to join the EaEU is 
evidence of its declining influence, regardless of its 
‘Greater Eurasian’ efforts.
The apparent collapse of the pan-European security 
system and the effective end of the post-Cold War 
era in 2014 appear not to have altered the rival 
principles that the EU and Russia would like to see 
order international affairs. In the face of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), however, Brussels 
and Moscow have transposed their European 
visions onto the wider Eurasian scene. Russia, 
ever keen to be accepted as an equal great power, 
emphasises political pluralism, polycentrism and 
the harmonisation of equal regional integration 
projects. The EU, although perhaps more cautious 
in the wake of the battle over Ukraine, continues 
to stress regulatory standards and a rules-based 
framework in its recently outlined Europe-asia 
connectivity strategy–principles which are central 
to the functioning of its own internal political order.
Five years after Maidan, is Moscow’s commitment to 
the Greater Eurasia paradigm a sign of global power’s 
continued eastward shift, or rather an indication 
of Russia’s weakness and reliance on other rising 
powers to maintain a global profile? How committed 
is Russia to integrating politically and economically 
with the rest of Eurasia? and following Volodymyr 
Zelenskiy’s election and the peaceful transfer of 
power in Ukraine, will Russia again look west, with 
the European model once more proving attractive 
to a critical mass of Russians?
This report, building on a workshop held at LSE IDEaS 
in December 2018 and supported by the Horizon 
2020 UPTaKE and Global Challenges Research Fund 
COMPaSS projects, brings together some of the 
UK’s foremost scholars on Russia, the EU and the 
post-Soviet space to evaluate the challenges and 
opportunities facing Russia’s ‘Greater Eurasia’ foreign 
policy concept.
***
Marcin Kaczmarski of the University of Glasgow 
and Derek averre of the University of Birmingham 
begin by evaluating the macro-level sources and 
consequences of the Greater Eurasian vision. The 
report then turns to two specific examples of Russia-
backed order-building in Eurasia–the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the EaEU–
drawing conclusions for the strength and viability 
of the Greater Eurasia paradigm. Roy allison of the 
University of Oxford looks at the SCO’s ability to serve 
as a pillar of Eurasian order, while Natasha Kuhrt of 
King’s College London explores the organisation’s 
future following its recent expansion to include 
India and Pakistan as full members. Rilka Dragneva-
Lewers from Birmingham then analyses the wider 
dynamics at play within the EaEU, before Moritz 
Pieper from the University of Salford concludes 
with a case study of Kazakhstani foreign policy 
and what it can tell us about the EaEU’s long-term 
cohesiveness.
Elena Korosteleva is Professor of International Politics 
at the University of Kent, Visiting Professor at LSE 
IDEAS, Principal Investigator of the GCRF COMPASS 
project and Co-Investigator of the H2020 UPTAKE 
project.
Zachary Paikin, a research affiliate with the H2020 
UPTAKE and GCRF COMPASS projects, is Assistant 
Lecturer in International Relations at the University 
of Kent and Senior Editor at Global Brief magazine. 
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GrEaTEr Eurasia:  
iT’s GrEaT-PowEr sTaTus, sTuPid! 
Marcin Kaczmarski 
Russian elites long sought a way to retain a privileged position in the post-Soviet space, including the Customs Union proposed in 
the aftermath of the 2008-09 global economic crisis, but it was only 
when Vladimir Putin proposed the Eurasian Union during the 2012 
presidential campaign that a breakthrough seemed apparent. However, 
the idea suffered a series of setbacks. 
The first blow came from Belarus and Kazakhstan, which opposed a 
political union and forced Moscow to limit its project to the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EaEU). The second was even more severe. The 
Kremlin failed to convince Ukraine to join the EaEU and at least partially 
fuelled pro-European sentiments among the Ukrainian opposition that 
culminated in the Maidan Revolution. The developments in Kyiv and 
Russia’s overt aggression meant that Ukraine would not become a 
jewel in the crown of Russian-led integration for the foreseeable future. 
Escalating Russia-West tensions since 2014 foreclosed another path 
for the EaEU’s development–a dialogue with and a formal recognition 
by the European Union. 
Parallel to the losses in the western corners of its regional project, 
Moscow had to face another challenge in the East. In autumn 2013, Xi 
Jinping proclaimed a new initiative directed at the post-Soviet space–the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, part of the New Silk Road, initially known as 
One Belt One Road and later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Russia’s response to these challenges came several years later in the 
concept of Greater Eurasia, often referred to as the Greater Eurasian 
Partnership.1 Initially, it was elaborated by a group of analysts from 
the Valdai Club, who in 2015 put forward the idea of Central Eurasia, 
within the framework of which Russian and Chinese projects could 
be merged. Vladimir Putin made it into an official policy in mid-2016, 
briefly sketching the idea at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum.2 The 
concept was almost deliberately vague, with a broadly sketched vision 
of bi- and multilateral cooperation between Russia, China, India, SCO, 
and aSEaN, with the Eurasian Economic Union as a core.
Russia’s concept of Greater Eurasia is difficult to 
comprehend without setting it in the context of the 
Chinese initiative. Six years ago, Beijing proposed a 
loose and vague formula for regional cooperation, 
which has taken on a life of its own since then. 
Dozens of Chinese think tanks have embarked upon 
BRI promotion. In the process, the concept lost 
its focus and for many in the expert community 
became identical with China’s foreign policy in 
general. Digital and Polar Silk Roads have only 
reinforced this impression. Increasingly equated 
by critics with China’s expansionist agenda, the 
BRI suffered a serious backlash and lost much 
of its previous appeal. Nonetheless, it cannot 
be denied that China has managed to make the 
concept universally recognizable, setting the tone 
for subsequent debates.3
Greater Eurasia has not enjoyed a similar success. 
While it gained some popularity among scholars 
of post-Soviet states and Russian foreign policy, it 
remains on the margins of the expert community’s 
imagination, not to mention the general public’s. 
It is, however, doubtful if the aim behind Greater 
Eurasia was to shape global discourse. I argue 
that from the Russian leadership’s perspective, the 
notion of Greater Eurasia was primarily supposed to 
address several deficiencies of its flagship regional 
cooperation project–the Eurasian Economic Union–
and thus revive Russia’s regional agenda.
First, Greater Eurasia allows Moscow to go beyond 
the boundaries of the post-Soviet space without 
losing what it perceives as a privileged or special 
position among its neighbours. The main incentive 
behind the EaEU was to maintain Moscow’s grip on 
its vicinities. The EaEU did, however, chain Russia 
not only to its post-Soviet space but also to its Soviet 
past. With the concept of Greater Eurasia, the EaEU 
is to remain the pillar on which additional layers of 
regional cooperation can be constructed. at the 
same time, Russia and its ambitions of arranging 
its regional space are no longer confined to the 
territory of the former Soviet Union. 
Second, the vagueness of the concept leaves it 
up to the Kremlin to decide when and whether its 
declared aims have been achieved. any form of 
cooperation with China, India or aSEaN states 
can be portrayed as another successful step in 
implementing the concept. Small steps, such as 
the free trade agreement between the EaEU and 
Vietnam, may be presented as part of building 
the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The lack of a 
concrete agenda that would have to be implemented 
according to a pre-planned schedule increases 
Moscow’s room for manoeuvre. as the experience 
of the EaEU illustrated, the Russian bureaucratic 
apparatus is not well prepared for coping with 
mundane efforts. The Ministry of Foreign affairs 
in particular feels more at home when dealing with 
grand albeit vague ‘strategic visions’.
Third, Greater Eurasia positions Russia as an equal 
vis-à-vis both the European Union and China. Toward 
European states, it is portrayed almost as a form 
of defiance–‘you did not want to pursue Greater 
Europe, we will now construct Greater Eurasia’. 
With respect to China, Russia demonstrates its 
strategic independence and its ability to exercise 
regional leadership. There is therefore no need to 
discuss Russia’s joining (or not) of the Belt and 
Road Initiative, which would suggest some form 
of subordination to China. Instead, both states 
can now debate how to harmonize their large-
scale political-economic projects. Once the EaEU 
and BRI are synchronized, it is China that joins 
Russia in the process of building the Greater 
Eurasian Partnership.4
all these aspects of Greater Eurasia have one 
underlying feature–they allow the Russian leadership 
to maintain the impression of great-powerhood, 
to cling to the status of a Eurasian great power. 
The ruling elite and the analytical and scholarly 
communities have found a common goal: to promote 
Russia as one of the pillars of the post-Western 
international order. Russia may either become 
an independent pole, a representative of Eurasia 
12  May 2019
in the global concert of great powers, or a co-leader of a broader 
Sino-Russian Eurasian bloc. The concept of Greater Eurasia allows 
Moscow to retain maximum flexibility and quickly adapt to changing 
circumstances, regardless of the extent to which it can be translated 
into concrete policies.
Meanwhile, the probability of Greater Eurasia going beyond the 
conceptual stage appears to be low, if not impossible. Russia faces 
a number of obstacles that prevent it from making Greater Eurasia 
a viable project.
In economic terms, Russia does not have much to offer its (Eur)asian 
partners. The EaEU has already facilitated China’s transportation links 
with Europe. It removed custom barriers between EaEU members and 
made paperwork easier. The trains travel between Sino-Kazakhstani 
and Belarusian-Polish borders uninterrupted. This was, however, 
relatively low-hanging fruit and the Greater Eurasian Partnership 
has nothing substantial to add to this. China signed a framework 
free trade agreement with the EaEU, but the number of exceptions 
limits its impact. at the same time, Beijing focuses its attention 
on creating an East asian free trade area, building the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Neither Russia nor its 
partner states have much to offer in terms of market size or industrial 
production. Their key resources–oil and gas, arms, civilian nuclear 
technology–are traded within specific frameworks and are usually left 
outside multilateral trade agreements. another commodity of growing 
importance to Russia–food–also requires separate agreements 
with potential customers, including China. Moscow cannot afford to 
invest in the development of infrastructure, either. Russia’s attempts 
to build a parallel financial infrastructure have failed. The Eurasian 
Development Bank, established by Russia and Kazakhstan over 
a decade ago, has not managed to attract international attention 
and both states decided to join the China-led asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (aIIB) in 2015 and 2016 respectively. With China’s 
help, this may change as the growing role of yuan in place of the US 
dollar in Sino-Russian trade illustrates. Still, the success will depend 
on the health of China’s economy and Beijing’s willingness to weaken 
the dollar’s domination than on Russia’s own efforts.5
Within the strategic and security realm, the biggest and probably 
insurmountable challenge to Moscow is how to reconcile conflicting 
interests and tensions between India, China and Pakistan. Despite 
its enlargement, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 
another building block of Greater Eurasia, has not narrowed down 
differences between the three antagonists. The recent tensions 
between New Delhi and Islamabad following the February Kashmir 
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terrorist attack illustrate the fragility of peace in 
South asia. Moreover, with the deepening power 
asymmetry between Russia and China, Moscow will 
not be able to play the role of a ‘balancer’ in Eurasia. 
There is also speculation that China’s close ties 
with Pakistan may have facilitated closer Russian-
Pakistani ties too. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied 
that these ties endanger Russia’s partnership with 
India. Moscow’s ever-closer cooperation with Beijing 
may pose a challenge for another element of the 
Greater Eurasian Partnership, i.e. ties with aSEaN 
members. Even states that have long enjoyed a 
fruitful relationship with Russia, such as Vietnam, 
are beginning to question Moscow’s ability to retain 
neutrality in the face of growing Chinese influence.
However, even though the potential of Greater 
Eurasia as a framework for regional cooperation is 
limited, the concept remains a useful instrument for 
the Kremlin. Given how deeply great-power identity 
is embedded in Russian political and intellectual 
elites’ mindsets, Greater Eurasia is a way to find a 
new mission for Russia in an evolving international 
order. China’s rise and Beijing’s trans-regional 
aspirations pose a particular challenge in this regard. 
The concept of Greater Eurasia papers over Sino-
Russian differences and postpones competition 
over influence in the post-Soviet space. It is a face-
saving initiative that helps to maintain the illusion 
of equality between Russia and China.
Nonetheless, Greater Eurasia does not solve the 
underlying tensions between Russia’s aspirations to 
great power status and its shrinking material base. 
Rather than forcing the Russian elite to reconsider 
to-date functioning of the political-economic system, 
it perpetuates illusions of Russian leadership. The 
Kremlin has at its disposal a number of instruments 
which allow it to perform certain roles traditionally 
associated with great powers, such as the UNSC 
membership and a strong military-industrial 
complex. However, it lacks the material foundation 
to implement more ambitious schemes, such as 
the establishment of durable regional cooperation, 
which would go beyond patron-client relations as 
in the case of Russia and Belarus.
The question thus emerges whether the concept of 
Greater Eurasia could be useful for scholars. The 
key challenge is that it is by default associated with 
Russia’s foreign policy, just as the Belt and Road 
Initiative is with China’s. Under such conditions, it 
can be difficult to make Greater Eurasia a relatively 
neutral term. Its political and normative context will 
trump its descriptive and explanatory functions.   
1   On Greater Eurasia, see for instance: Glenn Diesen Russia’s Geoeconomic Strategy 
for a Greater Eurasia, Routledge, 2018; Seçkin Köstem, Russia’s Search for a Greater 
Eurasia: Origins, Promises, and Prospects, Kennan Cable No. 40, 26 Feb 2019.
2 Plenary session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum, 17 June 
2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178.
3 On China’s BRI, see for instance Maximilian Mayer (ed.), Rethinking the Silk Road. China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018; Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications 
of the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017.
4 On relations between Russia and China in Eurasia, see for instance, Gaye 
Christoffersen, ‘Sino-Russian Accommodation and Adaptation in Eurasian 
Regional Order Formation’, Asian Perspective, 42(3), 2018, pp. 439-462.
5 On the economic component of Sino-Russian relations, see: Ray Silvius, ‘Chinese-Russian  
economic relations: developing the infrastructure of a multipolar global 
political economy?’ International Politics, online first, 2018.
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Today, the immediate prospects for any ‘cooperative’ East-West engagement are unpromising. The current Russia-US animus, 
despite the unpredictability of President Trump’s policy preferences 
and attitude towards Vladimir Putin, is deep-seated. The fundamental 
driving factors are, first, Russia’s defence of its sovereignty and 
regime legitimacy against perceived US attempts to undermine it, 
and second the reciprocal mistrust between the Russian and US 
defence and security establishments; these factors operate against 
the background of structural power shifts in the international system. 
The breakdown of arms control regimes, the current US military posture 
and the criticism of Russian actions in Ukraine have encouraged 
disruptive responses from Russia. This has primarily manifested itself 
in ‘asymmetrical responses’ in the form of cyber, disinformation and 
low-level kinetic activities. It has also been made clear in Putin’s strident 
rhetoric about Russia’s readiness to scale up a military response to 
NaTO’s presence in Poland and the Baltic states, its missile defence 
deployment and the US’s likely withdrawal from the INF treaty. In 
addition, Russia has launched a diplomatic offensive at the global level 
in the UN and at the regional level in the OSCE, as well as contesting 
the impartiality and legitimacy of international organisations where 
they are perceived as threatening Russian interests (for example, 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons over the 
alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government and over 
its role in the Skripal affair). 
The Russia-EU estrangement is no less unsettling. Here the driving 
factor is Russia’s governing elites’ defence of their political privileges 
and business interests against the encroachment of European norms 
of governance. This has given rise, first, to a values-based narrative 
of Russia’s cultural/civilisational exceptionalism, underpinned by a 
carefully cultivated national consensus. Second, it has encouraged 
Russian efforts to promote its own model in its neighbourhood using 
various instruments of statecraft, including a targeted information 
campaign. To my mind, the results in terms of constructing a coherent 
‘ideology of conservatism’ and a set of practices likely to bind the 
countries of the post-Soviet states to Russia are 
unconvincing. add to this a certain inertia in the 
way that Russia and Europe’s democracies perceive 
each other’s behaviour and we have at the present 
juncture a low level of trust and engagement over 
important policy issues.
I would describe Russia’s response to this state of 
affairs generally as ‘gaming’ the system. Moscow 
relies on tactical, pragmatic, instrumental moves 
in situations where it can afford to (for example in 
the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria), improvising and 
reacting to events rather than following a coherent 
and sustained strategy to shape international 
processes. But we should not ignore the fundamental 
tenets that constitute a national belief system and 
guide Russian foreign policy thinking, even though 
they are sometimes manipulated in specific cases 
and their normative foundations are certainly open 
to dispute. This belief system is based on the statist 
 
international legal norms of sovereignty and the 
sovereign equality of states in the international 
system, and the right of peoples to determine 
their own domestic order and not bow to external 
standards of legitimacy.
To turn to the future of the wider Eurasian space, 
a vision of a ‘Eurasian Union’ was presented by 
Vladimir Putin in his Izvestiya article in October 
2011 (well before the Ukraine crisis, note) and 
developed in later speeches, for example at the 
Valdai Club in September 2013. Putin declared that 
‘The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining 
the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian 
space in a new century and in a new world. Eurasian 
integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet 
space to become an independent centre for global 
development, rather than remaining on the outskirts 
of Europe and Asia’. 
To what extent has Moscow been successful in 
forming an alternative to a ‘European choice’–widely 
spoken of during Putin’s first presidency–in the form 
of a ‘Greater Eurasia’ with Russia as its hub?
Three aspects may be considered here:
1. Trade (including labour migration, energy 
and investment): a recent paper by Rilka 
Dragneva, Laure Delcour and colleagues1 
argued that, while there are formal and 
informal agreements binding Russia and 
neighbouring countries in the post-Soviet 
space, they provide few constraints on 
Russia’s unilateral action. at the same time, 
modernising regional economies in Eurasia 
want to diversify (and indeed have already 
done so to an extent) their trade/technology 
links. Russia–facing its own challenges 
in terms of structural reform and with its 
policy options limited by a number of political 
and economic constraints (problems with 
corruption, weak economic governance, and 
demands for welfare provision to lessen risk of 
social disintegration)–can provide only limited 
benefits to these countries. In this context, 
can we really talk about ‘hard regionalism’? 
These difficulties are compounded by the 
economic tensions between Russia and China 
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO), which is one of the factors that have 
prompted Beijing to promote alternative trade 
and infrastructure projects. These projects 
may well impact on Eurasian states’ policy 
preferences and consequently on their 
relations with Russia. Relations between 
China and the Eurasian Economic Union are 
very much at the formative stage. Russia’s 
own economic relations with asian countries, 
though improving in recent years, are still 
dwarfed by the latter’s trade with the Western 
economies.
2. Security: In a recent article, Roy allison 
argued persuasively that the functionality 
of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO) and the SCO ‘is low judging by their 
ability to implement various ambitious 
projects’.2 The emphasis in both cases has 
been on ‘protective integration’: deep regional 
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integration and collective approaches to conflict management 
are notably absent, despite some actions directed at addressing 
emerging security challenges and diplomatic coordination 
over specific issues. Their fundamental aim is to reinforce the 
sovereignty of their member states and ensure regime security 
and normative legitimacy. ‘Protective integration’ has suffered 
from Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and China has its own 
regional security ambitions which leave little space for anything 
more than its selective partnership with Russia. The CSTO and 
SCO are likely to endure, as there are common interests in 
privileging state sovereignty and preserving a ‘thin’ regional order 
to maintain stability and attenuate regional rivalries. However, 
the lack of reciprocal penetration into each other’s affairs, and 
the limited commonality in their domestic arrangements, means 
that they do not constitute a regional international society, still 
less a ‘security community’. an additional problem is that NaTO 
and the EU tend to avoid interaction with Eurasian organisations, 
preferring to maintain links with individual states in the region.
3. Identity: To my mind any ‘Eurasian identity’ is partial, contested 
and prey both to domestic forces and, increasingly, to influences 
from outside the region. as early as the 1990s scholars noted 
that differences in history, society and culture across the 
USSR successor states were producing a wide variation in 
types of post-communist state-building and that, despite a 
common Soviet legacy, political systems in these states have 
reflected considerable diversity. Is it time to do away with the 
idea of a ‘post-Soviet space’? Is Eurasia no more–to adapt the  
well-known concepts–than an ‘imagined community’ or an 
‘imagined geography’?
I offer two final points. The first point relates to the diminishing utility 
of notions of authoritarian/democratic, illiberal/liberal, East/West 
binaries in explaining Russia’s role in Eurasia in the context of wider 
developments in the contemporary international system. This because 
of (i) the constraints placed on governments arising from turbulence 
on international markets (protectionism, energy/commodities prices); 
(ii) the emergence of sudden and unforeseen crises that often have 
an impact globally as well as regionally (9/11 and international 
terrorism, the arab Spring and migration); and (iii) socio-economic and 
technological developments arising from globalisation that manifest 
themselves in different ways in terms of demands for political expression 
and social change (all too apparent in Europe itself). against this 
backdrop, all governments face difficulties in maintaining effective 
domestic governance and have diminished capacities to manage 
international conflicts. 
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The second point is that, while Russia-West relations do pose problems (aside from the methodological 
ones of assessing empirical evidence and subjecting it to appropriate rigorous analysis in the face of 
Russian, and sometimes Western, disinformation), this is more because of the disorder and fluidity that 
marks the contemporary international environment: politically, because of the (at least partial) shift away 
from Western hegemony; normatively, because it embodies conflicting norms; economically, because of 
contradictions inherent in globalisation that enshrine inequality; and in terms of security because it remains 
fundamentally statist.3 Western liberalism is in a bit of trouble and is struggling to manage change. at 
the same time Russia’s elevation of the state as a rhetorical reference point, and the use of the security 
apparatus to manage domestic policy and allow governing elites to monopolise the rules, risk stagnation 
and the ‘empty illusions’ of authoritarian modernisation, as Vladimir Gelman has argued.4 
One last point relates to the normative approach that a lot of academic writing has taken to analyse 
Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe in the post-Cold War world. an objective presentation of Russian 
foreign policy narratives and action, intended to form the basis for a deeper understanding of Russia’s 
approach, should not be attacked as justifying the norms that Russian elites appeal to. as Gelman has 
noted, the tendency in much commentary is to see authoritarian elites in Russia and Eurasia as ‘the “bad 
guys” responsible for their countries’ descent into the hell of authoritarianism’,5 but they simply pursue 
their own self-interest depending on their own perceptions and the institutional resources available. The 
maximisation of power by these elites is due to weak institutional and political constraints.  We should 
aim to offer, as far as possible, an objective explanation of the roots of Russian elites’ thinking and how it 
informs and underpins policy preferences and actions. Otherwise we are in danger of missing the fact that 
European norms are becoming much less important as a reference point against which Russia’s political 
elite measures its policy. Indeed, Ted Hopf’s argument–that Russia constructs its identity in relation to 
the US/Europe as its ‘significant others’6–should be subject to reappraisal at this time of far-reaching 
change in Russian foreign policy.   
1   Rilka Dragneva, Laure Delcour, Marta Jaroszewicz, Szymon Kardaś and Carolina 
Ungureanu, How Bilateral, Regional and International Regimes Shape the Extent, 
Significance and Nature of Interdependencies. EU-STRAT Working Paper no 8, March 
2018, at https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/fub188/22524/EU-STRAT-
Working-Paper-No-8.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 11 November 2018)
2 Roy Allison, Protective Integration and Security Policy Coordination: Comparing the SCO and CSTO.  
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 11(3), 2018, p. 297.
3 See Ian Clark, The post-Cold War order: the spoils of peace 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), chapter 1.
4 Vladimir Gel'man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015) chapter 5.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
6 Ted Hopf, Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia’s Great Power identities 
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ThE shanGhai CooPEraTion orGanisaTion:  
a FraCTurEd Basis For Eurasian ordEr 
Roy Allison
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the only longstanding multilateral framework with Russia and China 
as core member states which has had the potential to underwrite 
some Greater Eurasian order normatively and perhaps institutionally. 
However, this potential has never been realised and the prospects for 
a SCO-based Eurasian order have receded further in recent years.1
The SCO has displayed much top-down political fanfare, declarations 
of policy intent and claims of achievements. However, it has operated 
essentially as an intergovernmental network. Surprisingly little has 
materialised over the years from formal SCO multilateral processes 
which did not already exist in bilateral relations or most probably would 
have occurred anyway through bilateral channels or other regional 
initiatives.2 This is obscured by China’s reference ‘to its bilateral 
engagements with the Central asian states as “SCO” projects or 
initiatives’, even on issues where the organisation has not defined any 
common policy or adopted Beijing’s proposals.3 a multilateral stamp, 
therefore, is placed on output generated outside the SCO framework. 
However, the SCO has a significant discursive role for its member 
states. The foundational principles and norms of the SCO have played 
an important regime-legitimation function. For the Central asian 
states, lying between the large power patrons of the SCO (Russia 
and China), the role is one of ‘encoding’ various ‘alternative norms 
in the texts and written rules of an international organization’. These 
contest norms associated with the OSCE and a wider set of Western 
actors. alongside negotiated summit declarations, speeches and 
interviews, such texts offer valuable legitimation for local leaderships. 
SCO meetings, therefore, serve both to embed these norms among 
local elites and societies and gain acceptance for them regionally.4
The SCO does not claim that such norms, especially those expressed 
in the core values in official SCO documents and summit declarations–
the so-called ‘Shanghai spirit’–represent an ideology. But the language 
has an ideological tenor, expressing as it does the need to maintain a 
diversity of cultures, civilisations and political and economic models 
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within its organisation, non-alignment or a non-bloc 
approach, as well as the principles of non-interference 
in domestic affairs and territorial integrity. Notably, 
the SCO dedicated itself to combat the ‘three evils’ of 
‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’.5 Since these 
challenges are left undefined, member states can 
decide which domestic order problems are attributed 
to which ‘evil’. The SCO Charter pointedly refrains 
from referring to democracy as a goal in domestic 
politics, or to the self-determination of peoples. It 
contains no reference to the potential rights of non-
state actors or more direct representation of citizens. 
This encourages a permissive environment for state 
action against various forms of domestic political 
opposition and reinforces the statist character of 
SCO norms.
a central SCO norm at the global level is multipolarity. 
This serves as a discursive foil to ‘hegemonic’ 
policies led by the US and in essence appears as a 
soft form of power play between Russia and China 
on the one hand (with Russia more vociferously 
asserting the claim) and the leading Western powers 
on the other hand. However, Russia and China have 
not shared the same fervour to instrumentalise the 
SCO on the global stage.
Beijing may have had greater interest in developing 
‘a viable regional organisation infused with Chinese-
orientated values, which could in the future be 
replicated elsewhere’.6 This practical goal is impeded 
by Russia’s repeated efforts to pump up the global 
image of the organisation, to make maximal use 
of the SCO to claim that global structural power 
has shifted in favour of the ‘non-West’ and a 
levelling with Western power has been achieved. 
China prefers a more oblique, gradual and less 
confrontational approach to revising the Western-
inspired international order, an order which it decries 
like Russia. Moscow and Beijing maintain a rhetorical 
common front over a state- and sovereignty-oriented 
understanding of international order. But as Russia’s 
relations with Western states have become more 
adversarial and as its economy has remained in 
the doldrums, it has become more dependent on 
China in an increasingly asymmetrical relationship. 
Meanwhile, since 2014, Beijing has wished to avoid 
being railroaded into a vociferous Moscow-driven 
geopolitical campaign against Western states, in 
or beyond the SCO, despite Beijing’s fractious trade 
relations with the Trump administration. 
 
Separatism as a challenge to 
consensus on Eurasian order
The SCO charter defines separatism as a threat. 
It is one of the ‘three evils’ of the ideology of 
the Shanghai Spirit. article 1 of the 2001 SCO 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism 
and Extremism determined that separatism means 
‘any act intended to violate territorial integrity of 
a State including by annexation of any part of its 
territory or to disintegrate a State, committed in a 
violent manner, as well as planning and preparing 
and abetting such act’.7 
Russia’s revisionist approach to separatism on its 
Eurasian perimeter has thrown into question the 
concept of statehood in the Eurasian territory of 
the former USSR, according to which only former 
Union republics’ borders could be recognised as 
state borders. Prefigured by Russian recognition of 
South Ossetia and abkhazia in 2008, this challenge 
became acute with Russia’s annexation (note the 
2001 SCO Convention language on this) of Crimea 
in March 2014 and its subsequent ‘deniable’ support 
for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. 
The other SCO state leaders were inclined to bond 
with Russia in deploring the Maidan Revolution 
in Ukraine as illegitimate and extra-constitutional 
‘extremism’. However, the Russian actions which 
followed struck at the normative core of the 
Shanghai Spirit. They cast a shadow over the 2013-
15 cooperation programme for combating terrorism, 
separatism and extremism. at the Dushanbe SCO 
summit in September 2014, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping had to accept that among the ‘three evils’, ‘it 
is necessary at present to focus on the fight against 
22  May 2019
religious extremism and cyber terrorism’ (author’s emphasis).8 The 
summit declaration still outlawed separatism, but effectively diluted 
this and the other two ‘evils’ by expanding the blacklist to include 
the ideologies of ‘radicalism, fascism and chauvinism’, apparently 
reflecting Russia’s discourse on the crisis in Ukraine.9 This genuflection 
to Russian thinking was toned down the next year to the generic notion 
of ‘other radical ideas’; at subsequent summits the ritual reference to 
the ‘three evils’ resumed. 
This could not conceal that Russian claims about resisting separatism 
in its neighbourhood now appeared hollow. SCO declarations pointedly 
avoided any support for Russian claims over Ukraine. as with almost 
all other states in the international community, no SCO state (besides 
Russia itself) recognised Crimea as part of Russia. In their official 
national responses on the issue, China was muted but was aware 
that Moscow’s promotion of pro-Russian separatism on its borders 
‘implicitly undermines China’s efforts to contain separatists in Tibet, 
Xinjiang and, most importantly, Taiwan’.10 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
hedged their language to avoid confronting Russia, but the Kazakh 
leadership in particular was clearly nervous once again over Russian 
attitudes to the ethnic Russian-populated regions of their state. 
Uzbekistan in response openly deplored actions ‘that contradict 
the UN Charter and international norms’, specifying ‘sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of a country’.11 
Implications of enlargement
What are the implications of membership enlargement to include India 
and Pakistan for the functionality of the SCO and its consensus on 
Eurasian order? The joint inclusion of India and Pakistan in the SCO 
balances respectively Russian and Chinese regional partnerships. 
However, the question is whether the SCO is likely to become less 
coherent and more diffuse as form increasingly determines function 
rather than the other way around. The inclusion of India and Pakistan 
makes it likely that the SCO will limit its spheres of operation to political 
sub-state security, to the extent that agreement is achievable here, 
and to economic programmes, eschewing the deeper cooperation 
that a narrower membership might aspire to. 
The political and security policy differences between India and Pakistan 
threaten divisive effects of their accession to the SCO. First, they differ 
starkly in how they define terrorist groups in their neighbourhood. 
Secondly, we have argued that Russian empowerment of separatism in 
Ukraine has caused deep concern among other SCO states. India, with 
its longstanding struggle with separatism in Kashmir, with territorial 
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disputes with both China and Pakistan who claim 
historical, ethnic or religious linkages with groups 
in India, has a similar reaction.
India shared the general SCO disapproval of US 
and EU actions prior to and during the protests in 
Ukraine during 2013-14, reflecting an opposition 
to external actors becoming involved in other 
country’s domestic political affairs. It shared a SCO 
concern at the overthrow of a government (which it 
also noted was constitutionally elected), however 
unpopular, by street protests. But its disapproval of 
external political intervention as it saw it, has been 
outweighed by its disapproval of military intervention 
(by Russia), especially in support of separatism.12 
So New Delhi enters the SCO with an underlying 
uneasiness over Russia’s policies on separatism and 
their implications for Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir.
It is true that India–like its new SCO partner 
states–supports the non-interference principle 
and upholding national sovereignty. However, India 
will find it additionally awkward to bond around 
strategies to reinforce regime security within the 
SCO while it has a political system which prizes the 
diversity and turnover associated with democratic 
political practices. India and Pakistan hope to gain 
new economic relationships in Central asia from 
SCO membership. But the overall cohesion and 
normative bonds of the SCO are likely to weaken 
with this enlargement.
 
Continued dilution of SCO-based 
Eurasian order 
The potential for practical cooperation on the 
basis of the SCO, to undergird supposed normative 
congruence, has relied ever more on Chinese and 
Russian active interest in such cooperation in the 
regional centre of gravity of the SCO (until the recent 
enlargement, Central asia) and a healthy balance 
of interests between these powers. However, since 
2014, China’s reliance on the SCO in its wider 
foreign and economic policy priorities has been 
displaced by commitment to the ‘Belt and Road 
Initiative’ (BRI).13 This concept ‘serves as a format 
for multilateral cooperation and as an umbrella for 
a network of bilateral relations’ and with its ‘loose 
construction of normative underpinnings allows 
China to retain flexibility’.14 It signifies declining 
interest in the future trajectory of the SCO, perhaps 
even an acknowledgement by Beijing that having 
failed to advance its preferred goals by working 
within the organisation it has selected to bypass it. 
China was frustrated, for example, by a perception of 
routine Russian resistance to its attempts to establish 
a SCO Development Bank, as well as a regional free 
trade zone. Russia, aware that China would be the 
country with the largest investment share in the 
bank, felt this could contribute to Moscow’s relative 
marginalization in the region. Overall, Chinese 
geo-economic interests are much more effectively 
advanced now through infrastructure development 
programmes directly with Central asian states in 
the BRI framework than through the SCO structure, 
with its consensus decision-making process. This 
shift has been accompanied by still greater Chinese 
reliance on bilateral channels in regional security 
discussions with Central asian states. It is ironic 
that Moscow’s obsession with the contribution of the 
SCO to multipolarity and relative neglect of regional 
Chinese interests in the SCO in Central asia has had 
the opposite effect to the one desired. China has 
opted to privilege bilateral ties with Central asian 
states rather than be fully entrenched into the SCO’s 
multilateral framework.
This helps explain Beijing’s readiness to concede the 
expansion of the SCO to South asia and perhaps 
even to the Middle East in future. China seems 
less ready to view the SCO as a serious high-level 
platform for publicising normative congruity with 
Russia, beyond summit formalities, although the 
importance of seeking common positions over 
extremism and terrorism (with Xinjiang in mind) 
remains. Overall, the SCO has begun to stagnate 
between the crosscurrents of Chinese economic 
and Russian military/geopolitical interests. 
With the sharp increase of confrontational rhetoric 
between Russia and Western states after 2014, 
Russia has tried to institutionalize the military profile 
of the SCO beyond its longstanding regime security 
functions. Russian officers have floated the idea 
even of the SCO acquiring permanent executive 
responsibilities for different aspects of defence 
cooperation and of creating a military Cooperation 
Coordinating Committee.15 But this goes too far for 
other SCO states, since it would fuse the regime 
security functions of the SCO, skating over the 
aforementioned controversy with separatism, with 
defence alignment. China for one will continue to 
oppose such a profile of alignment for the SCO.
Russia’s ability to persuade the SCO states to 
sidestep the separatist controversy and to harden 
security and defence coordination has also been 
constrained by its narrative on Russian   civilizational 
entitlements. Notoriously this was used as part of 
Moscow’s justification for the annexation of Crimea. 
This jars with a UN Charter-focused restrictive view 
of sovereignty shared among other SCO states–and 
still rhetorically by Russia itself. at the regional level 
a new emphasis on the prominence of the ‘Russian 
world’, the rights of Russian ‘compatriots’ and the 
role of ‘historic justice’ detracts from the regime 
security of smaller SCO states and qualifies the 
cherished principle of non-interference.  The latest 
example of this assertion of entitlements was in 
april 2019, with the Russian offer of citizenship 
en masse to residents in part of Ukraine’s Donbas 
region and subsequently to some other categories 
of Ukrainian citizens.
These underlying concerns of Russia’s SCO partners 
mean that rising global tensions between the United 
States and Russia or China are unlikely to foster 
a new form of substantial SCO Eurasian security 
integration on an anti-Western platform, even if 
a Russian-Chinese bilateral axis in international 
diplomacy assumes more substance.  This does 
not bode well for the development of Russia’s 
amorphous ‘Greater Eurasia’ paradigm, beyond its 
current role of seeking to obscure the reality of 
the shifting Eurasian power balance from Russia 
to China. Efforts at forming a more coordinated 
and integrated Greater Eurasian space are unlikely 
to advance beyond photo opportunities, thin 
cooperation and a limited normative agenda, both 
regional and global. Meanwhile, the normative bonds 
of the SCO in particular are likely to continue to 
fray in response to assertive unilateral policies by 
Russia, as well as China’s growing confidence in its 
capacity to influence regional processes in Central 
asia through other means.   
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Integration and Security Policy Coordination: Comparing the SCO and CSTO’, The 
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an ExPandEd shanGhai CooPEraTion 
orGanisaTion: rEinviGoraTEd, or on ThE  
road To rEdundanCY? 
Natasha Kuhrt 
Both India and Pakistan have now entered the Chinese-sponsored and expanded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which 
raises a number of questions:  First of all, does this signal the 
emergence of a new regional order in Eurasia and acceptance of a 
Chinese-led cooperative arrangement? It further raises not only the 
question of the place of the Russian-sponsored Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) and Indian regional initiatives in South Asia in Eurasia, 
but also of the future role of the SCO vis-a-vis One Belt One Road 
(OBOR), now known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although 
China promotes the BRI as a purely economic project, China will likely 
need a secure environment to pursue its objectives. India is the only 
SCO member to oppose the BRI, which will cross Central Asia on its 
overland route. Further, will India’s entry, as the only parliamentary 
democracy, mean that the SCO will no longer be viewed as a ‘league 
of authoritarian gentlemen’?1
a common view is that the SCO is already–or will become–moribund, 
discarded as irrelevant once the BRI is rolled out:  ‘after the enlargement 
the SCO can be expected to be even less able to reconcile the 
visions of its particular members, which may result in its long-term 
marginalization’.2 On the other hand, could the underlying norms at 
the heart of the SCO (non-interference, anti-separatism and anti-
fundamentalism: ‘the three evils’) prove more durable than expected?
One of the challenges for the future role of the SCO is the fact that 
fundamental and underlying tensions remain in Chinese and Russian 
political visions for Central asia, between constituting this as an open 
or closed region. With India (and Pakistan’s) entry into the SCO, India 
is now being drawn into ‘Greater Eurasia’, a growing region for now 
understood to include the SCO member states, plus Iran (possibly 
afghanistan) and EaEU member states.
For both Russia and India, uncertainty regarding the nature and timing 
of any power transition from the United States to China presumes the 
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On the other hand, the US has been widely viewed 
as attempting to ‘groom’ India as its proxy in the 
East asian Regional Security Complex ever since 
President Obama announced the rebalancing 
strategy to the Asia-Pacific, and Trump has followed 
with ‘IndoPacCom’. Both Russia and China therefore 
view India’s role in the aPR with ambivalence. all 
these developments are part and parcel of the fact 
that a ‘contest is emerging over how to define Asia 
conceptually, including choice of terminology’.3 
Not only that, but what happens in one region is 
increasingly difficult to separate from what happens 
in another. In many respects China’s march westward 
is not only a logical solution to its surplus economic 
capacity and drive for stability in the Northwest, 
viz. Xinjiang and beyond, but also a response to US 
geopolitical pressure in East asia. 
Russia is also trying to put forward its own variant of 
regionalism, seeking to create its own ‘supercomplex’ 
of a ‘Greater Eurasia’. This pivot to Greater Eurasia 
has gained momentum since the Ukraine crisis, 
as a key part of what Sergei Karaganov sees as a 
means to counter the Western-led global order. Now 
there is no longer talk in Russia of a Greater Europe 
stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, but rather of 
a more land-based Eurasian concept, going from 
Shanghai to St Petersburg.
aleksandr Lukin has described the potential 
harmonisation of the EaEU and the BRI as a paradigm 
change in geopolitical terms. However, he warns that 
if the SCO becomes a more unwieldy organisation 
with the addition of new members, this will make it 
more difficult to coordinate future plans for Greater 
Eurasia within the SCO.4 In its own vision for the BRI 
however, China appears to be going beyond asia: 
apart from concerns expressed by multiple asian 
countries regarding lack of transparency and the 
loans-based nature of many projects, including  in 
India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia (where politicians have 
run on anti-BRI tickets) several European countries 
are also ambivalent.5 This concept goes beyond the 
EaEU and follows a Chinese approach to regional 
cooperation which is far broader and has no clear 
boundaries, potentially including ‘all players from 
China to India and aSEaN’.6 While the agreement 
between the BRI and the EaEU in theory creates 
a Greater Eurasia Partnership that would connect 
EaEU to the BRI and thus create a boundless space 
as per the remit of the BRI, Russia tends to see 
Greater Eurasia as a means of protecting its own 
space,7 quite differently to the functionalist Chinese 
approach which could include africa, the arctic and 
Latin america .  In David Lewis’ words, for Russia, 
Greater Eurasia is a ‘geopolitical imaginary’ and 
tightly bound up with Russia’s identity as a Eurasian 
power which is not the case for China.8 
Nevertheless, despite charges that China aims to 
challenge the Russian-backed EaEU, or to counter 
the US ‘pivot’ to the aPR, China has sought to present 
the BRI as a strategy of ‘reassurance’ and mutually 
beneficial cooperation, although this has met with 
limited success. India, in particular, has made its 
opposition to the BRI clear. 
What is the new rationale for the expanded 
organisation? Originally the SCO was established 
to monitor border agreements in Central asia/
China. yet borders have long ceased to feature 
much on the agenda of the organisation. Russia 
has always resisted China’s attempt to turn the SCO 
into an economic and energy club, while China has 
often been depicted as a free rider on Russia for 
regional security. 
China was eventually forced to shift the focus of 
its economic strategy in Eurasia from the SCO to 
the BRI, and the idea of a free trade zone among 
members is hardly ever mentioned in the latest SCO 
documents. For China, despite its frustration with 
Russian sabotaging of its attempts to use the SCO to 
promote regional economic cooperation, the SCO has 
nevertheless been highly significant. For example, it 
has been suggested that China has learned lessons 
via the SCO regarding ‘advancing geostrategic 
interests through multilateral organisations’9 and 
that China is in effect ‘practicing’ for its future 
global role. This echoes alexander Cooley who 
describes the SCO as one of China’s ‘most important 
contributions to global governance, embodying a 
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new IR that rejects US unilateralism and […] promotes 
cooperation based on principles of sovereign non-
interference and cultural diversity.’10 Does this imply 
then that other members are practising for roles 
as subordinate states that follow Chinese norms?
 
Russia And The SCO
Russian policymakers are more likely to express 
disappointment with the organisation, at times due to 
its lack of activity, at others due to the perception that 
it serves merely as a vehicle for Chinese interests. 
For example, andrei Kortunov notes that ‘In practice 
the role of the SCO was reduced to that of bringing 
bilateral or tripartite sub-regional economic projects 
together under one roof…This umbrella may have 
done something to conceal China’s economic 
domination in the region, but it didn’t change the 
essence of ongoing processes.’11
The enlarged SCO is being held up by some as a 
stronger, reinvigorated organisation. For example, 
the Secretary-General of the SCO, Rashid alimov, has 
claimed that ‘the importance of the SCO’s expanding 
trans-regionality from the Pacific to the Baltic and 
from the arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, suggests 
that with the accession of India and Pakistan, the 
SCO has acquired a global profile. We are witnessing 
important processes related to the crystallisation of 
a new type of organisation, which is based on mutual 
respect, deep dialogue of cultures and civilizations, 
aspiration for joint development and prosperity.’12
This echoes Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2018 SCO 
summit where he suggested that the new SCO 
‘transcends outdated concepts such as clash of 
civilisations, Cold War and Zero-sum mentality.’13 
One optimistic article by a Chinese scholar stresses 
that China expects support from other SCO member 
states in building a ‘community of shared future 
for humanity’ and that the SCO has emerged as a 
security community, and ‘unlike either NaTO based 
on U.S. hegemony or the EU with common security 
policy, it is a new type of security community’.14 
India’s entry into the SCO had been mooted for some 
time, and often seen as a means for Russia to dilute 
China’s weight in the organisation. yet India’s identity 
is as a parliamentary democracy, and it projects itself 
to a certain extent as an alternative to China and as 
a ‘model for other developing states’.15
Why then should India wish to participate in an 
organisation that consciously pits itself against 
the US-led order? 
Russia (and to some extent China) has presented 
the SCO as an institution capable of promoting 
certain regional and local norms distinct from those 
being promoted by the unipolar world, and as further 
evidence of the emergence of a multipolar world. yet 
this remains mostly declarative. On the other hand, 
returning to the issue of norms and their possible 
re-legitimation via the SCO, alexander Cooley has 
suggested seeing civilizational diversity as the 
new ‘counter-norm’ and as the guiding principle 
of the SCO.16 This certainly fits with the idea of 
‘norm antipreneurs’ put forward by Bloomfield and 
Scott.17 although one might hesitate to place India 
in such a category, it also, along with China and 
Russia, increasingly embraces a certain civilisational 
rhetoric,18 India has sought to present itself as a 
‘synthesiser’ of civilisations, drawing on its rich 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious heritage.19 
 
Terrorism
at a presidential meeting in June in astana, 
Kazakhstan, the presidents of the member states 
signed a declaration on combating extremism 
and international terrorism, and reiterated their 
commitment to a peaceful, non-military solution 
to the afghan issue.
The shared regional agenda around terrorism is 
the one area that appears to have strengthened 
in particular since the crisis in Syria and Russia’s 
involvement there. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov drew particular attention to the proposed 
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membership of India and Pakistan in the SCO in this 
regard, and to the fact that their involvement would 
strengthen the fight against terrorism in Eurasia, 
while the SCO chief, Nikolai Patrushev, suggested 
that ‘all disagreements between Iran, Russia, China, 
India and Pakistan would be cast aside’ due to the 
pressing need to coordinate in the face of the 
growing shared threat from terrorism.20 On the other 
hand, others have questioned the extent to which 
the SCO might function in this way, pointing to the 
proposal by China to establish an anti-terrorism 
alliance with afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan 
outside the SCO framework and not to include Russia 
in the setup. For some this demonstrates a failure on 
Russia’s part to contain Chinese power via the SCO 
and highlights limitations in the area of intelligence-
sharing and counterterrorism.21
India has said that the SCO platform can ‘enhance 
trade and connectivity’ but has also emphasised 
that security is ‘our top priority’. Prime Minister 
Modi laid the ground for India’s opposition to the 
BRI project during his plenary speech when he said 
that India welcomed connectivity projects but only 
those that ‘respect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of nations’.22 
The question then arises as to whether China’s 
proposed BRI project could also assist India in 
developing such ties. India has approached it with 
caution, as might be expected, given difficult bilateral 
relations, and further, China has not invited India to 
join the overland route, but only the maritime one. 
On the other hand, as some have pointed out, by 
joining the SCO it might seem as if India is more 
likely to connect to the Silk Road Economic Belt 
than the Maritime Silk Route. However, given that 
both Russian and even US plans for regional projects 
are jeopardised by the more ambitious Chinese 
plans, India might therefore be expected to be more 
enthusiastic in the future about schemes with other 
regional players like Russia. yet at the same time, 
Russia’s increasing dependence on China and its 
acquiescence in Chinese economic plans for the 
wider region mean that the cooperation agreement 
between the EaEU and the BRI on developing links 
across Eurasia might look more threatening to India, 
as it could serve to increase Chinese economic 
dominance in both East and South asia.
 
Conclusion
The new rationale for the SCO appears elusive, and 
the accession of India and Pakistan has revealed 
differences between members’ priorities. Chinese 
dominance of the SCO and the diverging views of 
China and Russia on SCO objectives over the years 
remain a problem. Previously, the division of labour 
within Central asia appeared clear, as the Chinese 
tended to try to push the SCO in an economic 
direction, while Russia emphasized political and 
security aspects. It has become commonplace to 
suggest that the ‘Chinese vision is about prioritizing 
economics while Russia’s is political’,23 and certainly 
this was true to a large extent of the SCO.
yet as the BRI evolves, politics and economics could 
be harder to separate, in particular if the SCO is 
potentially reconfigured towards security concerns, 
as some have predicted.24 China is showing signs of 
becoming a more political actor, with officials making 
speeches that hint at a more proactive and engaged 
approach to ideas about regional international order, 
a development that is a cause of anxiety in Moscow. 
Russia is playing for time by signing deals with China 
such as the BRI-EaEU agreement, but it has no real 
strategy for dealing with China as a potential regional 
and global security actor. The lack of strategy is 
partly because it has long been taboo to discuss 
China as a threat, at least on an official level, while 
China is conspicuous by its absence in the military 
doctrine. The SCO is the only institution that has the 
potential to dilute Chinese influence, but China may 
fear being constrained by it. In 2017 Russia began to 
refocus on the CSTO: it allocated more money to the 
organisation and has increased military assistance 
to Tajikistan as well as sharing Special Forces 
Operation training with Central asian Countries.25 
However, the extent to which such institutions can 
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constrain China is unclear, as Dmitri Trenin points 
out, ‘[E]ven if Beijing sees some value in continent-
wide geopolitical constructs—such as the SCO and 
the RIC [Russia-India-China] promoted by Russia 
and where China is the most powerful member—
Moscow will find it increasingly harder to make 
those constructs work’.26
The fears of many states regarding the trajectory 
of BRI reflect wider fears of Chinese hegemony 
at the global level. China’s future status may well 
depend on its ability to deliver the public goods 
that it has promised by means of the BRI project. 
This ability will be highly contingent on geopolitical, 
geo-economic and geostrategic risks that to a large 
extent remain unquantified. For now, the interests of 
regional powers appear more related to advancing 
their own narrow interests than a concerted attempt 
to build a pan-regional agenda based on norms. 
Underlying tensions remain in Chinese and Russian 
political visions for the region, between constituting 
this as an open or closed region: with India’s entry 
into the SCO and its apparent interest in a free 
trade agreement with the EaEU, India is now 
being drawn into the Greater Eurasian region, one 
that may be increasingly dominated by China, at 
least in economic terms. although in the context 
of worsening relations with the West, Russia has 
deepened its substantive partnership with China 
and the cooperation agreement signed in May 2016 
between the EAEU and BRI confirms this pattern. On 
the SCO, there is a danger that China’s need for a 
secure environment in Central asia means that the 
organisation’s focus will become counterterrorism 
as practised in Xinjiang, and that the serious 
geopolitical divisions between Russia, China and 
India, not to mention India-Pakistan, will prevent any 
convergence of norms. The future of the SCO should 
not be dismissed outright: Even if not a fully-fledged 
security community, it can still serve as a platform for 
regional powers to discuss mutual concerns. yet in 
the words of andrei Kortunov, the SCO has ‘obviously 
entered adulthood, but it has not yet emerged as a 
fully mature international institution. Furthermore, 
it runs the risk of becoming an “eternal teenager”.’27
Given the lack of information about the precise 
contours and trajectory of the BRI project, and how 
existing institutions will coexist with or connect to it, 
Russia can afford to sit back and take comfort in its 
‘geopolitical imaginary’ of Greater Eurasia which is 
similar in its proposed scope to the BRI, but arguably 
of a more geopolitical hue. as a recent Russian 
analysis points out, the vagueness and elusiveness 
of the Greater Eurasian vision allows Russia to ‘fill it 
with any substance, fearing no consequences, and 
boost its own image, taking no risks whatsoever’.28    
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The inception of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) project is inextricably related to its international role. For Russia, the 
EAEU serves primarily a geopolitical function, which is two-fold: 
firstly, to endow the country with the regional clout to participate in 
the structuring of a post-Western world, and secondly, to provide it 
with a ‘gate-keeper’ framework through which Moscow can influence 
the access of external actors to ‘its’ region. While initially Moscow’s 
primary focus was to establish the EAEU as an innate part of Greater 
Europe,1 the crisis with the West following the 2014 annexation 
of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, turned its attention to 
the East. Throughout late 2015 and 2016, officials developed the 
Greater Eurasian Partnership strategy in a series of high-level 
political statements. Thus, this is a Russian policy initiative not to 
be confused with concepts, such as ‘wider Eurasia’, used by the 
EU and other international players. As outlined there, the Greater 
Eurasian Partnership represents a platform for cooperation between 
various organisations and groupings in Eurasia, such as the EAEU, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN, as well as a range 
of major regional powers, such as China, India, Pakistan and Iran.2 
While the specific institutional detail behind the strategy is scarce, 
the EaEU has been attributed a central role within it as a vehicle for 
these interactions. This has been presented both as a legal necessity, 
given the level of integration between the members of the EaEU, and 
a testimony to the viability of the organisation and its attractiveness 
to international partners. From the perspective of the Russian elite 
and many outside observers, the EaEU appeared to be indispensable 
to Greater Eurasia. Upon closer inspection, however, the potential of 
the EaEU to deliver on this agenda is much less convincing. This is 
because of the institutional nature of the EaEU, its record in engaging 
in international trade and economic cooperation to date, and the extent 
to which it continues to be its members’ preferred vehicle for dealing 
with external actors.
The EAEU as an external actor
The international role of the EaEU is premised 
on it being an organisation with its own legal 
personality, endowed by its member states with 
important autonomous powers to pursue a set of 
common economic objectives. This translates into 
the argument that external actors should deal with 
EaEU bodies rather than the national authorities 
of its member states. In particular, similarly to the 
European Commission, the Eurasian Economic 
Commission (EEC) is presented as an independent 
technocratic party, pursuing the interests of the Union 
and able to appear on its behalf. The institutional 
reality, however, is different from the rhetoric. The 
legal powers of the EaEU and its relevance as a 
formal partner in the international arena depend 
on the issue in question. 
In areas such as tariff and customs regulation, 
trade regulation and the imposition of trade defence 
measures, EaEU member states have transferred 
significant powers to the EEC. However, this 
delegation of powers does not translate into the 
competence to negotiate independently. according 
to the established process, dealing with third parties 
always occurs with the participation of the member 
states. Unlike the European Commission, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission is not empowered 
to appear on its own; in practice, it supports the 
member states in their own negotiations. In other 
areas, where delegation of national powers has not 
occurred, such as transport, services or investment, 
the Commission is not part of the negotiations at 
all. Instead, the approach adopted by the EaEU 
is for negotiating teams to be composed by the 
member states’ representatives under Russia’s 
general leadership, with the Commission acting 
only as a facilitator. 
Thus, in formal terms, not only does the EaEU 
not function as a unified actor, it also masks the 
prominence of its member states even in areas 
of delegated authority. at the same time, while 
according to its founding treaty all EaEU member 
states enjoy equal representation and have equal 
ability to determine the EaEU’s strategic direction, 
in practice Russia determines the agenda. Its 
dominance in the external dealings of the EaEU is 
even more pronounced than in its internal matters. 
This is not only because for Russia, more than for 
the other member states, the external role of the 
EAEU defines the primary utility of the organisation. 
It is also derived from its superior resources and 
expertise in dealing with the complex technical 
issues involved in negotiating international trade 
agreements. Indeed, the record of the EaEU’s 
external engagement to date offers ample illustration 
of Russia’s strategic initiative in selecting partners.
 
The record so far 
Since its launch, the EaEU has been keen to show 
itself as a dynamic global actor. It has concluded 
memoranda of understanding with countries across 
four continents as well as trade agreements with 
Vietnam in 2015 and Iran in 2018, and an economic 
cooperation agreement with China in 2018. Since 
late 2015, it has also been negotiating free trade 
agreements with India, Israel, Singapore and Egypt.3 
One notable feature of this record is that the choice 
of partners, the impetus for advancing relations with 
them as well as the negotiation process are all clearly 
driven by Russia’s geopolitical interests. The main 
attraction of entering a free trade agreement with 
Vietnam, for example, was not its trade importance–
Vietnam accounts for less than 1% of the EaEU’s 
total trade–but its significance as representing the 
economic dimension of an important geopolitical 
shift.4 The agreement was built on Russia’s 
traditionally close political relations with Vietnam, 
while seeking to establish a strategic partner in the 
Asia Pacific, thus advancing the multipolarization 
of Eurasia in the face of rising Beijing. Moscow’s 
leadership has been notable in relations with 
China too. The initiative of linking the EaEU with 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative was a Russian move 
announced at a high-level bilateral meeting without 
prior consultation with its EaEU partners. While the 
project was endorsed at a subsequent EaEU summit, 
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it has not removed the preference of those partners to deal with 
China on a bilateral basis. Similarly, the EaEU’s current negotiating 
agenda, including Israel, Singapore, India and Egypt, is defined by 
their significance for Russia’s global agenda.5  
Given this justification, it is unsurprising that in terms of their substance 
the EaEU’s agreements contribute little to trade liberalisation. The 
agreement with Vietnam covers 88% of mutual trade in goods, yet it is 
highly protectionist. The agreement with Iran is a temporary agreement 
with a very limited scope: it covers a short list of commodities and 
envisages few trade concessions. The agreement with China is not 
a free trade agreement at all, but a deal that provides for procedural 
cooperation and exchange of information on the basis of existing 
WTO arrangements.  
The potential economic benefits of the EAEU’s deals relate to the 
development of investments, infrastructure and logistics. For example, 
a deal with Singapore, which already applies low tariffs, will only deliver 
economic added value if services and investments are liberalised. 
The agreement with Iran or the planned deal with India can bring 
benefits only if transport infrastructure, such as the International 
North South Transportation Corridor, is developed. This dimension is 
particularly strong in terms of relations with China where cooperation 
on specific infrastructure, logistics and transport projects is at the 
heart of what was described as the ‘mutual synchronisation [linking] 
of the processes of constructing the EaEU and the Economic Belt of 
the Silk Road’.6 Critically, however, these are areas which fall outside 
the current remit of the EaEU. Thus, Russia has been keen to bring its 
EaEU partners’ external dealings within the common EaEU framework. 
Common interests
It is notable that, unlike Russia, the primary interest of its EaEU 
partners has not related to the organisation’s external dealings, 
but its consolidation and delivery of economic benefits. There has 
been little commonality in members’ approaches to addressing the 
international agenda of the EaEU.7 EaEU members have acquiesced 
to Moscow’s lead as part of a complex regional bargain.8 at the same 
time, they have been keen to retain a degree of flexibility within the 
organisation and autonomy in their external relations. Notably, Russia’s 
partners have abstained from supporting its economic warfare with 
the West. Instead, Belarus and Kazakhstan have sought to profit by 
circumventing the sanctions regime. 
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Furthermore, given the continued sensitivity to 
Russia’s regional dominance, they have sought to 
balance its power by maintaining and developing 
bilateral relations with key external partners, such 
as China and the EU. While interest in developing 
EU-EaEU relations has been shown, the support for 
a mega-deal has increasingly become a matter of 
rhetoric. Instead, in December 2015, Kazakhstan 
completed a bilateral non-preferential agreement 
with the EU aiming to strengthen political dialogue 
and promote mutual trade and investments. In 
November 2017, armenia signed a Comprehensive 
Partnership agreement (CEPa) with the EU. Both 
agreements exclude matters falling within the 
core competences of the EaEU, such as tariff 
regulation. Nonetheless, CEPa contains extensive 
commitments related to services, investment and 
sectoral regulatory approximation, while both 
frameworks chart an ambitious agenda which can 
be developed by the bilateral bodies set up under the 
respective agreements. This dynamic is also seen in 
relation to dealing with China and its Belt and Road 
Initiative. Kazakhstan, for example, has been keen to 
pursue its own ‘linking’ agenda to receive Chinese 
investment for projects outlined in its 2014 Nurly Zhol 
state programme.
Despite the constraints of the EaEU framework, this 
preference for bilateralism can be expected to grow 
stronger not least because of Russia’s own actions. 
Moscow supplements the EaEU framework with its 
own bilateral arrangements: the FTa with Vietnam 
contains a chapter on services and investment 
which applies only to Russia; similarly, Moscow is 
discussing its own Russia-China bilateral agreement 
on the Eurasian Economic Partnership.9 Such actions 
make the geopolitical utility of the EaEU framework 
even more transparent, but also send a signal to its 
EaEU partners.
Conclusions
Despite Russia’s effort to place the EaEU in the 
centre of its Greater Eurasian strategy, the results 
to date are highly limited. The EU, being the largest 
trade partner of the EaEU’s members, has to date 
refrained from recognising the EaEU or entering into 
a mega-deal with it.10 at a symbolic level, China has 
shown greater flexibility. President Xi committed to 
stating that ‘China supports Russia’s active efforts to 
advance the integration processes within the EaEU’, 
thus securing the external recognition desired by 
the Kremlin.11 This step was a major concession 
given Beijing’s preference for developing relations 
within the format of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation where its economic dominance is 
manifest. yet, the impact of this has proven limited, 
with Beijing’s preference for dealing directly with 
astana (or Nur-Sultan, as recently renamed), 
yerevan or Minsk in plain view. Other asian partners 
have been sceptical about the opportunistic 
nature of Russia’s commitment, in particular, its 
propensity to strike ‘unconnected bilateral deals 
exacerbated by a lack of follow through’, raising 
doubts about its long-term commitment ‘once other 
opportunities beckon’.12
Thus, it is hard to conclude that the EaEU will be a 
defining actor in any Greater Eurasian Partnership 
framework. Its instrumental role for Russia has been 
important. However, both its institutional set-up 
and its record so far have shown that it is unlikely 
to replace the complexity of bilateral relationships 
in Eurasian politics.   
1 Vladimir Putin, ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii–budishchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia segodnia’ 
[New Integraion Project for Eurasia: a Future which is Born Today], Izvestiya, 4 October 2011.
2 For example, Vladimir Putin, Address to the Plenary Session of the St. Petersburg International 
Economic forum, 17 June 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178.
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Putin’s Geopolitical Project’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 2018, https://www.
fpri.org/article/2018/10/the-eurasian-economic-union-putins-geopolitical-project/.
4 Nikolai Fedorov, ‘Soglashenie o zone svobodnoi torgovli mezhdu EAES and V’etnamom kak 
factor Rosiisko-V’etnamskikh otnoshenii’ [The FTA between EAEU and Vietnam as a factor in 
Russia-Vietnam Relations], Sravnitel’naia Politika and Geopolitika, 9 (1), 2017, pp. 74-90. 
5 Dragneva 2018.
6 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the Chinese People’s 
Republic, 8 May 2015, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4971.
7 A. Devyatkov, ‘The EAEU’s International Ties up to 2015’, in RIAC (2017) EAEU Development 
Prospects up to 2025, http://russiancouncil.ru/papers/EAEU2025-Paper-en.pdf.
8 R. Dragneva, K. Wolczuk, ‘The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power’, 
Chatham House Research Paper, May 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/publications/research/2017-05-02-eurasian-economic-union-dragneva-wolczuk.pdf.
9 ‘We agreed on fostering greater economic partnership with China–Putin’, Sputnik, 10 June 
2018, https://sputniknews.com/world/201806101065279324-russia-china-putin-speech.
10 Rilka Dragneva, ‘Pork, Peace and Principles: the Prospects for Region-to-Region Relations 
between the EU and the EAEU’, in R. Petrov and S. Lorenzmeier, Contemporary Issues of EU 
External Relations: From Shared Competences to Shared Values, Springer, forthcoming 2019.
11 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the Chinese People’s 
Republic, 8 May 2015, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4971.
12 Richard Weitz, ‘Putin’s Perennial Pivot Problem’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2016, 
https://thediplomat.come/2016/01/putins-perennial-pivot-problem.
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ThE linChPin oF Eurasia:  
KazaKhsTan and ThE Eurasian EConoMiC 
union BETwEEn russia’s dEFEnsivE 
rEGionalisM and China’s nEw silK roads 
Moritz Pieper 
Kazakhstan sees itself as the linchpin of Eurasia and has long been a staunch supporter of cross-border initiatives that help 
alleviate its disadvantages as a landlocked country. The government 
was therefore quick to embrace the construction of new rail and road 
links as part of China’s overland ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) 
after Chinese president Xi Jinping came to Nazarbayev University in 
Astana in September 2013 to announce the creation of new economic 
corridors across Eurasia as part of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI).1 
The creation of a new ‘Eurasian’ order, however, will likely be the 
outcome of the interaction between China’s new Eurasian policies, 
Russia’s various foreign policy concepts (including its ‘Greater Eurasia’ 
vision’), and other regional actors’ reactions, including Kazakhstan’s. 
Kazakhstan within the BRI
On Xi’s visit, China and Kazakhstan signed contracts worth US$ 30 
billion. Some of the investments, now rebranded under the BRI banner, 
predate the launch of the initiative: China had already made substantial 
investments in the energy sector in the 2000s, e.g. competing with 
Russian companies Transneft and Gazprom, well before Xi launched 
the BRI initiative.
The announcement of the BRI was convenient timing for Kazakhstan, 
as the government had embarked on its own government spending 
programme, Nurly Zhol, to kick-start the economy after the 2008-9 
financial crisis and the depreciation of the Tenge, the national currency. 
Infrastructure investments were seen as a complement to the country’s 
“Kazakhstan 2050” strategy for economic diversification.2
Even though Nurly Zhol predates the BRI, officials have quickly identified 
potential synergies between both frameworks. In September 2015, on a 
state visit to Beijing, President Nazarbayev then formally aligned Nurly 
Zhol with the SREB by signing a declaration on a docking (‘sopriazhenie’) 
of the two frameworks. What this means in practice is harder to pinpoint, 
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according to a joint plan issued in 2016, the three top 
priorities of Chinese-Kazakh economic cooperation 
are investments in transport infrastructure, trade, and 
the manufacturing industries.4 Chinese funding for 
Kazakh infrastructure development primarily goes 
into the railway and road connections to increase 
transborder trade.
a new dry port for westbound cargo has been built 
at the Kazakh-Chinese border for the transshipment 
of Chinese trains. Like most European trains, 
Chinese trains operate on a track gauge of 1.435 
meters, while the track gauge in countries of the 
former Soviet Union, such as Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, is 1.52 meters. Consequently, freight 
containers entering Kazakhstan from China need 
to be shifted onto the wider track gauge by cranes. 
With six parallel railway tracks, the Khorgos port 
has an efficient handling capacity. And after China 
ratified the UN’s International Road Transports (TIR) 
Convention in 2016, special bloc trains can be sealed 
with certificates that obviate the need to inspect the 
contents at each border crossing. Transcontinental 
trains en route to Europe began transiting Khorgos 
already in the summer of 2015.
Kazakhstani critiques of Chinese 
business practices
China’s investments in Kazakhstan are not without 
criticism, however. These usually involve a loan 
given by one of the Chinese policy banks (Chinese 
Development Bank and Exim Bank in most cases), 
which requires that the recipient (and guarantor) 
of the loan reinvest the money in a project that 
involves a Chinese contract partner.5 The Chinese 
partner involved either provides EPC (engineering, 
procurement, construction)–which in essence 
is a turn-key operation–or EPCF (engineering, 
procurement, construction and financing). The 
Kazakh Samruk-Kazyna national fund then 
functions as the investor.6 Large projects often 
stipulate a minimum of Chinese content (49 %) as 
part of interest-bearing concessional loans. Such 
‘concessions’ in the form of project oversight hardly 
benefit the local economy. 
Local protests in Kazakhstan in 2016 over a land 
reform bill (and similar reactions to a perceived 
Chinese attempt to lease Kazakh agricultural land 
already in 2010) further drove home the message 
that Kazakhs are concerned about Chinese labour 
migration and that more soft power efforts are 
needed to counteract a simmering Sinophobia. The 
2016 legislation would have extended the maximum 
lease on farming land for foreigners from 10 to 25 
years. any foreigners would have been eligible under 
the terms of the law, but the public outburst was 
directed at China. Popular protests quickly formed 
against the legislation, which was seen as paving 
the way for a Chinese land grab. In a rare retreat, the 
Kazakh government had to suspend the proposed 
legislation, the agriculture minister resigned, and 
Prime Minister Karim Masimov even issued a public 
apology for the government’s handling of the land 
reform bill.7      
Multilateralising China’s influence in 
the region
a key transit hub for China, Kazakhstan is also a 
member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU). 
The EaEU, as a regional integration project with 
supranational institutions, theoretically reduces 
customs duties and eliminates non-tariff barriers 
between member states. This opens Kazakhstan up 
to a bigger regional market while protecting domestic 
industries from the competitive prices of imported 
Chinese products. Kazakhstan also makes money 
from the transit of goods coming from China (even 
though infrastructure maintenance costs might eat 
up the revenues from transit). at the same time, 
Kazakhstan’s geographic location at the crossroads 
of other Central asian markets, as a transit country 
for at least two of China’s economic corridors in the 
BRI framework (China-Central and West asia, and 
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the new Eurasian land bridge), and as a recipient of 
Chinese outward direct investments and increased 
cross-border commerce are all ostensible benefits 
for the Kazakh economy. 
In terms of tariff policies, the EaEU is an instrument 
to contain China’s economic influence in the region, 
as it ties recipient countries of Chinese imports and 
investments like Kazakhstan to the operating rules of 
a customs union. EaEU external tariffs will no longer 
be imposed unilaterally by Kazakhstan after the 
government committed to raise its external tariffs 
in order to converge towards the higher Russian 
tariff when it became a member of the Eurasian 
Customs Union (ECU).8 Trade, however, remains 
a member state competence and there are EaEU 
tariff harmonisation exceptions until 2024 that were 
agreed upon when Kazakhstan joined the WTO in 
November 2015.9 
a 2015 Valdai report argued that cooperation 
between China’s SREB and the EaEU could mark 
the birth of the ‘Central Eurasian Moment’.10 Officially, 
both Russia and China have embraced a discourse 
of inter-regional economic cooperation. In May 
2015, Russia and China signed two economic 
framework declarations,11 and prospects for greater 
convergence between the SREB and the EaEU were 
also on the agenda of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) summit in July of the same year, 
but concrete projects have not yet gotten off the 
ground. Unofficially, Russia -- the predominant actor 
within the EaEU -- is not interested in the prospect of 
an FTa between the EaEU and China. a compromise 
was found for the declaration of May 2015, where 
paragraph II.4 speaks of an FTa between the EaEU 
and China as a ‘distant goal’.12
The Kazakh government does not support the idea 
of a Free Trade area between China and the EaEU 
either. The free-trade agreement signed in astana 
in May 2018 between China and the EaEU is non-
preferential, meaning that tariffs remain in place. 
The government’s language on free trade between 
China and the EaEU therefore sounds rather non-
committal. at the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 
in Beijing, President Nazarbayev vaguely applauded 
the idea of a common economic space as follows: 
‘The Silk Road Economic Belt can advantageously 
link the platforms of the SCO, the EaEU and the 
European Union in a single regional territory of 
prosperity.’13 Embracing the idea of enhanced cross-
border trade in general, such language brushes 
over the partially incompatible complex regulatory 
frameworks of the different projects involved.
Russia and Kazakhstan have their own disagreements 
over the EaEU too. Former President Nazarbayev 
has criticized the ‘politicisation’ of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, has refused to devolve trade policy 
competences to the EaEU’s Commission, and has 
resisted Russian attempts to give the EaEU a bigger 
say in security and defence matters.14 
The perception that Russia uses the EaEU to advance 
political (rather than purely economic) objectives 
was further nurtured by the fact that there are BRI-
EaEU working groups that bring together Russian 
and Chinese officials before policy discussions are 
taken to an enlarged format that comprises all five 
EaEU members.15 In other words, Russia implicitly 
speaks on behalf of the EaEU in these groups.  
Kazakhstan within the ‘Greater 
Eurasia’ paradigm
Kazakhstan signed an association agreement with 
the European Union and is working with the EU on 
its Central asia strategy. as a bridgehead state in 
Central asia, Kazakhstan has been receptive to ideas 
of pan-continental connectivity projects. Russia’s 
‘Greater Eurasia’ concept is one such example of 
a vision of regional order that comes with foreign 
policy implications for Kazakhstan. With its ‘Greater 
Eurasia’ vision, the Russian government seeks 
to create a common space in Eurasia in concert 
with other influential powers like China, but where 
Russia remains an indispensable power pole. It 
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has replaced the earlier ‘Greater Europe’ vision and 
has positioned Russia as a self-perceived counter-
hegemonic actor in opposition to the West. On a 
discourse level, Russia’s ‘Greater Eurasia’ narrative 
is partly also a response to China’s BRI: It reclaims 
the public discourse over Eurasian order and dilutes 
China’s economic domination in the form of a pan-
continental, and vague, vision of a ‘Greater Eurasian 
partnership’ to potentially include actors as varied 
as EaEU member states, India, China, Pakistan, or 
organisations such as the SCO and aSEaN. 
Here, Russia’s narrative of ‘Greater Eurasia’ is not 
necessarily congruent with Kazakhstan’s idea of 
its own ‘multi-vector foreign policy’, which entails 
an equidistance between Russia and China. 
Kazakhstan’s location as a geostrategic “hub” at 
the crossroads of the SREB and the EaEU means 
that it is at the sharp end of frictions between the 
main sponsors of the two projects: Russia and China. 
For the first time in modern history, Russia’s power 
is receding while China has already replaced Russia 
as the region’s most important trading partner. So 
far, however, Russia’s long-standing cultural ties 
with Central asian states, their shared Soviet history 
and memory politics, and a common language all 
continue to give Russia lasting influence in the 
region, alongside its significant military presence 
and predominance in the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO). 
Nevertheless, Russia’s Greater Eurasia paradigm 
will still not be the silver bullet to solve its or its 
region’s difficult identity questions. Pressures on 
Kazakhstan in particular will still remain. Kazakhstan 
remains caught between Russia and its ‘Greater 
Eurasia’ vision on the one hand and the Belt and 
Road Initiative on the other, and does not want to 
exclude partnerships with Western governments 
either. China’s growing profile in Central Asia in 
particular represents a tectonic geopolitical shift 
in the making of a new Eurasian order, which both 
Kazakhstan and Russia hope to be able to co-
manage in one way or another.   
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